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We exploit the regional variation in negative attitudes towards immigrants to
Sweden in order to analyse the consequences of negative attitudes on refugees’
utility from labour income and amenities. We find that attitudes towards immigrants
are important: while they affect mainly the refugees’ quality of life, they also affect
their income. We estimate the utility effects of negative attitudes for refugees with
different levels of education and gender. We also analyse how the size of the
refugees’ networks relate to their quality of life and income as well as how negative
attitudes towards immigration and networks interact.
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Sweden has gone from being a land of emigration to a land of immigration. Immigration
was insignificant until World War II. During the first post-war decades, there was a sharp
increase in demand for labour and workers were recruited from other European coun-
tries. These early labour immigrants adapted fairly well and gradually became accepted in
the cities they settled in.1 Since the 1970s, when the need for labour shrank substantially,
immigration to Sweden has become increasingly restricted to political refugees and their
families. No other affluent nation in recent decades has accepted as many political refu-
gees per capita as Sweden. The share of foreign born reached 16.5 % in 2014, with over
half of this fraction from non-developed countries.2
Sweden is well known for its longstanding generosity in providing a safe haven to refu-
gees.3 Still, many studies have detected the existence of negative attitudes towards immi-
grants in the country.4 For example, the SOM Institute (University of Gothenburg) has
investigated attitudes towards immigration and refugees since 1986, finding growing
resistance against receiving refugees until 1992, while thereafter, attitudes have slowly
become less resistant. Despite this, by 2005, nearly half the population thought that it
was a good suggestion to receive fewer refugees in Sweden (see the evolution of attitudes
in the period 1986–2010 in Figure 1 in the Appendix).
Attitudes towards immigration are potentially important for immigrants to get inte-
grated in the labour market. Discrimination is an important aspect to focus on regard-
ing where refugees choose where to live. But do attitudes reflect discrimination? Or
are they just something that is said but never acted upon? We explore if discrimination
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discrimination and may be less of a concern.
Studies making a comparison across European countries, for example Card et al. (2005),
find that Sweden is one of the countries with the most generous attitudes towards immi-
grants. Therefore, if we find any effect of negative attitudes, then immigrants’ utility may
potentially be even more affected in other countries.
The aim of this paper is to exploit regional variation in negative attitudes towards immi-
gration in order to analyse whether the mobility decisions and the labour market out-
comes of refugees are affected by such attitudes. We recognize that not every native with
negative attitudes may discriminate against immigrants, but we conjecture that negative
attitudes are systematically related to discrimination. We choose to analyse income as the
labour market outcome variable as it is affected by both wages and employment.
We concentrate on a group of refugees for which there is some exogenous source of
variation in their first location in Sweden, given by a refugee settlement policy pursued
by the government. We interpret the movements away from this first location as indi-
cation of better labour market conditions and/or better amenities or quality of life. We
account for the fact that the refugees are not a homogeneous group by considering het-
erogeneity by the level of education and by gender.
Identification fails if some other factor, that we are not considering, determines the level
of attitudes and the differences in income and amenities in the region. We test this by in-
cluding a placebo group in our analysis, immigrants from developed countries, that we ex-
pect to be very little affected by negative attitudes. The idea is that, if our estimation of
the effect of attitudes on income and amenities is the result of some other factor that pro-
duces lower income, we should estimate similar effects on this placebo group. We find
that attitudes towards immigrants are of importance for the refugees, but they have no ef-
fect on the quality of life or income of immigrants from developed countries.
The income an individual gets is assumed to be a function of negative attitudes and net-
works, as well as several individual and municipal characteristics. We start by assuming
that the residual of this income function for a refugee living where he or she has been
placed is uncorrelated with the income residual the same refugee would have if he or she
moved to another municipality. Then, in our preferred specification, we introduce a re-
sidual correlation that recognizes that high-ability refugees, who have positive residuals
upon placement, are likely to also have positive residuals after moving.
Once we recognize that unobservable characteristics of the refugees affect their income in
all municipalities, we find that negative attitudes are mainly a problem, in terms of income,
for refugees that stayed where they had been placed. The fact that refugees tend to move to
municipalities with lower negative attitudes indicates that their quality of life is lower the
larger the negative attitudes are. The relationship between negative attitudes and the quality
of life of refugees is much stronger than the relationship with their income.
The refugees’ choice of where to live also may be affected by the availability of networks.
We consider the share of refugees in the municipality as a measure of the potential net-
work. We explore how networks affect the refugees’ income and quality of life as well as
the interaction between networks and negative attitudes towards immigration.
The relationship between the size of networks and the amenities of refugees is much stron-
ger than the relationship with their income. Larger networks are associated with much larger
amenities for all refugees, larger income for the refugees that stayed where they had been
Waisman and Larsen IZA Journal of Migration  (2016) 5:8 Page 3 of 32placed and slightly smaller income for those who moved. Refugees who stay where they have
been placed may have been luckier and placed where they already had a useful network at ar-
rival. Alternatively, they may have been more attractive for the municipalities and therefore
may have been placed according to their choice close to their relatives already in the country.
Those who moved after placement may have been less attractive for the municipalities and
less capable of benefitting from a network even after moving. Instead, they may suffer from
competition from other better-connected refugees in the municipality they choose to move
to. Movers still move to municipalities with a much larger share of refugees, which indicates
that the increase in the quality of life is much larger than the decrease in income.
The interaction between negative attitudes towards immigration and the size of networks
are of importance as well. The negative relationship between negative attitudes and quality
of life becomes larger when networks are larger. The same is true about the negative rela-
tionship between negative attitudes and stayers’ income, while the negative relationship be-
tween negative attitudes and movers’ income becomes smaller when networks are larger.
2 Related research
Our paper relates to research on the discrimination of immigrants in the labour mar-
ket, migration decisions and, in particular, empirical research about Sweden.
Our setting relates both to research on individuals’ migration decisions (Sjaastad (1962))
and self-selection (Roy (1951)). Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) and Borjas et al. (1992) apply
Roy’s self-selection framework to internal migration. Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) study
how wealth may impact migrations in the presence of migration cost and credit constraints.
Valuing weather’s contribution to quality of life has received considerable attention in the
compensating differential literature. The value of a weather characteristic can be estimated
by the incomes a household is willing to forego to live in a place with that characteristic.
Empirical research shows, for example, that US households strongly valuate weather’s con-
tribution to quality of life (Cragg and Kahn 1999; Costa and Kahn 2003; Rappaport 2007).
Kennan and Walker (2011) describe a model where, in addition to expected income, migra-
tion decisions are influenced by moving costs, by differences in climate and by differences
in location size measured by the population in each location. These are variables we also
assume to affect the immigrants’ decision to move.
Other studies analyse the internal migration decision in Scandinavia. Åslund (2001)
finds that immigrants to Sweden are attracted to regions with many immigrants, better
labour market opportunities and many welfare recipients. Damm and Rosholm (2005)
find that geographical mobility has large positive effects on the hazard rate into the first
job, suggesting that restrictions on placed refugees’ subsequent out-migration would
hamper the labour market integration of refugees. None of these studies considers the
effect of different attitudes towards immigrants on their migration decision.
Several papers explain negative attitudes towards immigrants (see, for example Card
et al. (2005), Markaki and Longhi (2013) and d’Hombres and Nunziata (2015)). In a
companion paper, Larsen and Waisman (2016) examine the impact of discrimination
on labour market performance of immigrants in a theoretical setting. In this paper we
are instead interested in examining the impact of these attitudes on the immigrants’
utility from labour income and amenities.
Henry (2009) shows that the probability of African-American migrants choosing a city
in the USA is significantly reduced by the level of race-based crimes by racially intolerant
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versity. In her analysis, she does not study how attitudes affect labour market outcomes.
Knabe et al. (2009) analyse the effects of right-wing extremism on the well-being of
immigrants in Germany. They find that the higher vote shares for the extreme right are
associated with a lower subjective well-being of immigrants. Moreover, educated immi-
grants are more strongly affected by right-wing attitudes of the host population than
low-skilled immigrants. Compared to our paper, this study uses a different measure of
right-wing attitudes in the native population and a subjective measure of life satisfac-
tion, as they do not infer quality of life from migration decisions.
Several empirical studies (for example Bevelander and Skyt Nielsen (1999) and Arai
et al. (1999)) have found lower income and employment rates for immigrants than for
comparable natives in Sweden. These studies cannot tell us if the differences are caused
by ethnic discrimination or differences in unobserved characteristics between the two
populations. By analysing the difference in labour market outcomes in regions with differ-
ent attitudes towards immigrants, we intend to test discrimination in a more direct way.
Other studies perform different types of more direct tests of discrimination in
Sweden (for example, Rooth (2001) and Åslund and Rooth (2005)). These studies focus
on the labour market outcomes of certain groups of immigrants, while we consider that
attitudes may affect their migration decision as well.3 Empirical background, data and empirical strategy
3.1 Empirical background
3.1.1 Refugee settlement policy
Immigrants’ sorting is based on both observable and unobservable factors, which makes
it generally difficult to study the effect of negative attitudes on migration decisions and
labour market outcomes. We will study a group of immigrants for which there is some
exogenous source of variation in their first location in Sweden, given by a refugee
settlement policy pursued by the government from 1985 to 1994. The movement from
this first location is considered to be endogenous in our analysis and provides informa-
tion about the quality of life refugees experience in different regions, their expected in-
come gain and their cost of moving.
Edin et al. (2003) describe the refugee settlement process. Newly arrived refugees
were placed in different local municipalities according to certain well-defined criteria.
The idea of the programme was to get an even distribution of immigrants and facilitate
integration. Most refugees, of course, applied for residence in the traditional immigrant
cities of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. However, there were very few flat vacancies
in these locations, particularly during the second half of the 1980s when the housing
market was booming. When the number of applicants exceeded the number of avail-
able slots, municipal officers selected the “best” refugees. There was no interaction be-
tween municipal officers and refugees. The selection was, hence, purely in terms of
observable characteristics; language, formal qualifications and family size seem to have
been the governing criteria. When the municipalities could “cream-skim”, they selected
highly educated individuals and individuals that spoke the same language as some
members of the resident immigrant stock. Single individuals were particularly difficult
to place, since small flats were extremely scarce. There were no restrictions on ex post
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programme.
The fact that municipalities selected individuals that spoke the same language as
some members of the resident immigrant stock may explain why networks are particu-
larly valuable for those who stayed where they had been placed.
3.1.2 Negative attitudes towards immigration
Markaki and Longhi (2013) describe several theories of attitudes formation. Ac-
cording to rational conflict theories, the economic circumstances of the area and
the size of the minority group relative to the native population are important
sources of threat (Stein et al. 2000). Feelings of threat among natives are expected
to be higher in areas that are less affluent and with more immigrants. Intergroup
contact theory predicts that higher concentrations of immigrants and exposure to
an ethnically diverse environment will foster more positive feelings between the
two groups (Marschall and Stolle 2004).
The national unemployment does not seem to be correlated over time with the nega-
tive attitudes towards immigrants at the national level, but there seems to be some cor-
relation with the unemployment of immigrants (see Figure 2 in the Appendix).
However, in a cross-sectional exercise, when we correlate the average unemployment
over the period in each municipality with our measure of negative attitudes towards
immigrants, we find a very small negative correlation (−0.08).
It is then not clear that receiving more refugees should increase the population’s
negative attitudes towards immigration. There is, to our knowledge, no data available
on the evolution of municipal attitudes towards immigrants over time, so we cannot
directly test this assumption. Hjerm (2009) concludes in a sociological study in Sweden
that experience of a recent influx of immigrants to the municipality does not matter for
levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. Similarly, Card et al. (2005) find a negative relation
between higher immigrant stocks and the fraction of people who want to restrict immi-
gration in Europe, but the relationship is not statistically significant. In the same spirit,
the Social Research Institute for Migration Watch, MORI (2003) claims that more or
less negative or positive views on multiculturalism, immigration and asylum seem to
bear little relation to actual numbers of immigrants or asylum seekers in each region in
the UK. Card et al. (2012) find instead that more immigrants are associated with lower
amenities or quality of life for natives and produce more negative attitudes about
immigration.
In Sweden, at the national level, the attitudes towards immigration have become less
negative over the period 1990 to 2010 (see Figure 1 in the Appendix). The share of
immigrants has increased from 9.2 to 14.7 % of the population in the same period. The
latest SOM Institute rapport (University of Gothenburg) shows that 45 % of the Swedes
wanted Sweden to accept fewer refugees in 2013. This is a sharp decrease from 65 %
20 years ago.
Despite the fact that attitudes towards immigrants at the national level do not seem
to vary with unemployment or the share of immigrants in the country, we still address
this possibility by considering data on attitudes measured prior to the refugee settle-
ment policy. We are in this way assuming that the distribution of attitudes over time is
constant across municipalities.
Waisman and Larsen IZA Journal of Migration  (2016) 5:8 Page 6 of 323.2 Data
Data on the labour market performance of refugees is available in the Longitudinal In-
dividual Data Base (LINDA) stored at Statistics Sweden. Income registers and popula-
tion census data constitute the core of the data set.5 It contains information on 300,000
individuals annually plus a non-overlapping sample of 20 % of all immigrants. From
this database, we obtain information about the immigrant’s income, country of origin,
year of immigration, the municipality where he or she lived upon arrival, where the per-
son currently lives, their level of education and factors such as age and civil status. We
use an unbalanced panel of data from 1996 (2 years after the latest arrivals) to 2010.
We cannot observe which immigrants in LINDA are refugees, so we restrict the analysis
to the countries from which most refugees came while the refugee settlement policy was
pursued. Table 1 lists the origin of 99.2 % of the accepted refugees in the period 1990–
1994,6 that is, those immigrants who were granted residence permits according to the
Genève convention, de facto refugees, persons in need of protection, humanitarian rea-
sons and special refugee quota.7
During this period, almost 23,500 immigrants were granted residence permits as refu-
gees on average every year. But many more, around 40,000 individuals came as asylum
seekers from the countries in our sample per year and may have received residence per-
mits in later years; 62.7 % of the immigrants from the countries in our sample that re-
ceived residence permits were refugees.
Immigrants also received residence permits for family reunion and labour market
reasons. Only 64 out of the 218 immigrants who received residence permits for labour
market reasons per year came from the countries in our sample. The labour market im-
migrants came mainly from the UK, Germany, Poland, China, the USA, former Yugo-
slavia, Holland and Japan (and are not included in our sample).
The remaining 37.1 % of the residence permits in our sample allowed families to re-
unite. The immigrants receiving permits for family reunion reasons came mainly from
former Yugoslavia, Iran, Turkey, Poland, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, Thailand, the USA,
Ethiopia, the UK, Chile, Philippines, Vietnam and Germany. During this period, 40 % of
the immigrants coming to Sweden for family reunion reasons (from any country of origin)
were joining a refugee. This share is much larger for those coming from the countries in
our sample. When a family joins an immigrant that came to Sweden as a refugee and was
placed by the government, it will be indirectly affected by the placement as well.
Our sample contains 3300 individuals that arrived in the period 1985–1994. Table 1
shows that most immigrants coming from the countries in the sample at the arrival
period studied were refugees and only 0.1 % of them entered as labour market immi-
grants. Therefore, we refer to the whole group as refugees in this paper.
We will repeat the analysis on a group of immigrants arriving in the same period from de-
veloped countries, that is, countries in the OECD at that point in time8 as a placebo. This
group of immigrants is unlikely to be affected by negative attitudes to the same degree as
refugees are. The advantage of using this group instead of natives as a placebo is that they
are more similar in the sense of not knowing the language and culture when they arrive.
We obtain our measure of attitudes towards immigrants from five cross-sectional
surveys on Swedish Opinion collected from 1979 to February 1985 by Stiftelsen för
Opinionsanalyser (SSD 0099, Göteborg University). The data was collected through a
mail survey sent to around 2000 individuals aged 17–80. We pool the answers of all
Table 1 Immigrants to Sweden from selected countries
Sample countries Refugeesa Family reunions Labour market Total
Ex Yugoslavia 13,860 3080 12 16,952
Poland 47 1356 19 1422
Romania 201 427 627
Russia 172 489 6 667
Ethiopia 623 575 1197
Somalia 1323 819 2142
Uganda 91 91
Cuba 88 88
Chile 135 436 571
Afghanistan 116 116
Bangladesh 86 1 87
Iraq 2663 955 3617
Iran 1542 1532 3 3077
China 78 220 19 317
Lebanon 596 650 1246
Sri Lanka 83 157 240
Syria 416 429 846
Turkey 401 1517 1918
Stateless/unknownb 892 1230 6 2128
Total coming from countries in our sample 23,410 13,872 64 37,346
Other countriesc 69 8101 154 8254
Total all countries 23,479 21,972 218 45,600
Amount of immigrants on average per year during the period 1990–1994. Source: Migrationsverket
aGranted residence permits according to the Genève convention, de facto refugees, persons in need of protection,
humanitarian reasons and special refugee quota
bStateless and unknown (mainly Palestinians), former Soviet Union and Peru, where many asylum seekers came from in
the period
cFor family reunions: mainly the UK, Germany, the USA, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. For labour permits: mainly the
UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Canada, the USA, Brazil, Japan and South Korea.
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terested in the question: “How important do you think less immigration is?”. The pos-
sible answers with fractions shown in parenthesis are (1) very important (25.75 %), (2)
quite important (23.45 %), (3) not very important (11.35 %), (4) not important at all
(fine now) (17.69 %), (5) better with more immigrants (3.13 %), (6) hesitant (13.83 %)
and (7) no answer (4.80 %).9 We construct a measure of negative attitudes by adding
the number of individuals answering (1) or (2) and deducting those answering (5).10
This variable is normalized to vary between 0 and 1. A map of Sweden in Figure 3 in
the Appendix shows how attitudes are distributed throughout the country.
We measure the size of networks available to refugees as the share of immigrants com-
ing from Africa, South America and Asia. We obtain this measure from Statistics Sweden.
We also obtain from Statistics Sweden the following municipal characteristics: open
unemployment, the municipal tax rates and population. The geographic characteristics in-
cluded in the analysis are the latitude (which affects how dark it becomes in winter) and
the 10-year average minimum temperature in the winter (January to March).
Table 2 includes descriptive statistics of the variables of interest in our study. These
include individual characteristics of the refugees and the characteristics of the
Table 2 Summary statistics
Observations Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Individual characteristics
Ln income 145,014 11.3 1.5 −0.7 16.2
Share well educated 212,686 0.23 0.4 0 1
Age 212,910 37.0 11.9 15 65
Share women 212,686 0.51 0.5 0 1
Share married 212,686 0.59 0.5 0 1
Municipal characteristics where
the stayers live
Neg. attitudes tow. immigration 94,632 0.338 0.1 0 0.64
Share refugees 94,632 0.075 0.05 0.003 0.264
Open unemployment 94,632 4.54 1.85 0.79 13.65
Municipal tax rate 94,608 31.1 1.27 26.5 34.41
Population 89,383 224.2 256.9 3.6 847.1
Latitude 94,632 58.4 1.69 55.37 67.17
Avge. min. temperature winter 94,632 −4.49 2.28 −18.67 −1.33
Municipal characteristics where
the movers live
Neg. attitudes tow. immigration 118,047 0.332 0.1 0 0.75
Share refugees 118,047 0.073 0.05 0.003 0.264
Open unemployment 118,027 4.44 1.83 0.79 11.40
Municipal tax rate 118,005 31.03 1.22 26.5 34.41
Population (thousands) 110,830 210.9 243.7 3.2 847.1
Latitude 118,047 58.1 1.67 55.37 67.17
Avge. min. temperature winter 118,047 −4.10 2.17 −18,67 −1.33
Municipal characteristics where
the movers were placed
Neg. attitudes tow. immigration 118,054 0.343 0.1 0 0.75
Share refugees 118,054 0.037 0.04 0.003 0.264
Open unemployment 118,054 4.39 1.74 0.79 13.79
Municipal tax rate 117,634 31.81 1.18 26.5 34.41
Population 110,836 75.2 156.6 2.5 847.1
Latitude 118,054 59.32 2.50 55.37 67.85
Avge. min. temperature winter 118,054 −6.35 3.61 −20 −1.33
Sample composed of citizens of the countries listed in Table 1 that immigrated to Sweden in the years 1985–1994. The
sample corresponds to the years 1996–2010. Refugees include family reunification. “% high education” is the share of
immigrants with more than high-school education. “Avge. min. temperature winter” is the average minimum temperature
in winter in a 10-year period
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sample, 45 % stayed where they had been placed. Low educated stayed more often than
well educated where they had been placed (51 versus 46 %) and women more often
than men (52 versus 47 %).
If we compare the municipalities of placement, we observe that movers were, on
average, placed in municipalities with more severe negative attitudes, lower share of
refugees, lower municipal tax rates, much smaller population, lower average
temperature in winter and larger latitude than the municipalities where stayers on aver-
age had been placed. When they move, they relocate to municipalities with less
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population, warmer weather and brighter winters.
These are the factors we will consider as determining the quality of life and cost of
moving of refugees. These are the same factors that affect the refugees’ income; we only
exclude the geographic conditions from the income equations. The migration decisions
of refugees suggested by these mean values are consistent with our theory. However,
this is only a comparison of means and we need a deeper analysis of the data to meas-
ure the effect of negative attitudes.
3.3 Empirical strategy
First, we estimate a probit regression to analyse how the variables of interest (negative
attitudes towards immigration and size of networks available) affect the probability that
an immigrant stays where he or she was placed. We control for all the individual and
municipal characteristics described in Table 2. We cannot control for fixed effects at
the individual level because very few individuals in our sample moved during 1996–
2010.11 We also cannot control for fixed effects at the municipal level since attitudes
are assumed to be constant over time. We will control for fixed effects at the labour
market area level instead. The division of the 290 municipalities into 70 labour market
areas is built by Statistics Sweden based on actual commuting conditions. The pattern
and intensity of commuting flows decide how the municipalities are combined into
these labour market areas. Labour market areas are a good unit for controlling for simi-
lar labour market conditions that are constant over time. We control for time trends
by including year effects.
Second, we study the effect of the variables of interest on the refugees’ income. A
problem here is that even if the placement of refugees makes the first location exogen-
ous, many refugees moved from this first location and the choice where to move was,
as seen in the probit, affected by the variables of interest. So for the movers, the charac-
teristics of the municipality where they live are endogenous. We therefore begin by
studying the income of those refugees who chose to stay where they had been placed.
As the decision to move is affected by attitudes and networks, we need to correct for
the bias introduced by considering only stayers using Heckman’s correction Heckman
(1979). We include the same controls as in the probit regressions, except for the geo-
graphic conditions (exclusion restriction).
Until now, we have ignored the information we have on the movers’ incomes. We
can actually make use of all the information we have by studying the migration decision
directly which is what we do in the next stages of our analysis. In this way, we exploit
the fact that refugees were placed in their first location by the government and that
some of them chose to move, providing us with additional information about their
preferences by their new location choice.
We study the migration decision for individual i given by Eqs. (1) and (2):
If UGi −U
P
i > Ci; then i moves ð1Þ
If UGi −U
P
i ≤ Ci; then i stays ð2Þ
where U is utility, P is the municipality where the individual has been placed and G is the
target municipality, that is, the municipality where the individual considers moving to.
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P
i ¼ yGi −yPi
 þ QGi −QPi 
The individual utility is assumed to be composed by two elements: labour income, yJi ;
J ¼ G; P, and amenities or quality of life, QJi ; J ¼ G; P. The quality of life or amenities
in municipality J, QJi , represent the value of living in a certain municipality because of
the weather, nature, etc.
For movers, we know where they were placed, P, and where they moved to after-
wards, G. But we cannot observe to which municipality a stayer considered moving.
We define the target municipality of stayers as the average municipality where all refu-
gees that were placed in a given municipality are living in 2010. This measure reflects
both the refugees that stayed where they were placed and the destination of the movers.
We assume then that all refugees staying in one municipality of placement had the
same target in mind, the target they decided not to move to. In this way, we use the
refugees’ own revealed preferences when we determine what the potential target would
have been.12
In our analysis, we collapse the difference in quality of life or amenities and the cost
of moving into one variable QPi −Q
G
i −ci . We consider that the individual variables affect
mainly the cost of moving, while the difference in municipal characteristics between
the placement and the target municipality affects mainly the difference in quality of
life.
The income function at placement is assumed to have the form:
yPi a
P; NP
  ¼ α0 XP þ β0 Zi þ μPi;










where XP are municipal characteristics at placement, including negative attitudes, aP,







tures the individual characteristics, and μPi is an error term.
Similarly, the income function at the target municipality has the form:
yGi a
G;NG
  ¼ γ 0 XG þ δ0 Zi þ μGi;

















that characterize the labour market conditions in
municipality J are the open unemployment and municipal tax rates. The size of the
population is also related to the economic conditions in the municipality and is also in-
cluded as a control. We include fixed effects at the labour market area level to capture
additional labour market differences across regions that are constant during the period
of analysis. We control for the following individual characteristics: education, age, age
squared, gender and civil status. We control for year effects as well.
We acknowledge that the income the individual has in municipality J, y Ji ,
13 depends on
the negative attitudes towards immigrants (aJ), potentially due to discrimination, and the
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USA and shows that the network significantly improves labour market outcomes among
its members.




  ¼ η0 XP−XG þ ζZi þ ωI ;
η0 XP−XG















where (XP − XG) is the difference between the municipal characteristics at the place-
ment (P) and those at the target municipality (G).
The amenities or quality of life depend on the same factors that affect income plus
additional geographic controls: latitude and the 10-year average minimum temperature
in the winter. In the literature on amenities, it is common to hypothesize that people
prefer moderate climates. There is evidence of discrimination in other markets than
the labour market, notably the housing market, as well as in the education system
(OECD 2013). Negative attitudes are then likely to affect the quality of life through the
way in which refugees are treated in, for example, schools. Zavodny (1997) shows that
new immigrants are attracted to areas with large immigrant populations. Also, Pedersen
et al. (2008) find significant network effects in the location decision. Pacheco et al. (2013)
analyse immigration flows for a panel of 16 OECD countries from 1991 to 2000 and find
that factors such as the stock of immigrants from the source country already living in the
OECD destination country, population size, relative incomes and geographic factors all
significantly drive the flow of immigration.
The cost of moving is assumed to depend on individual characteristics: education,
age, age squared, gender and civil status. It is, for example, likely to be harder for a
family with children in school to move, than it is for a single person.
In the structural estimation, the variables of interest (the negative attitudes towards
immigrants and the size of the networks) are allowed to affect, as the equations indi-
cated, both the decision to stay or move via the differential effect on the quality of life
and the income of the individual. We allow for separate coefficients for stayers and
movers, as we see no reason to assume they are identically affected by the variables of
interest.
In our base equations, we assume that the residuals in the income and amenity re-
gressions at the placement and target municipalities are independent of each other.
This assumption may not be realistic. High-ability refugees that have positive residuals
upon placement are likely also to have positive residuals after moving. We incorporate
two alternative positive correlations in residuals (0.25 and 0.50) in the estimation in
order to see how our results are affected.
Identification rests on the assumption that the effect of the variables of interest on
the income and quality of life is independent of the residual terms. Identification fails if
some other factor, through its impact on the residual terms, determines both the level
of attitudes and the differences in income and quality of life in the region. It could be
imagined, for example, that a generally bad labour market causes poor outcomes for re-
cent immigrants as well as negative attitudes among natives. While the attitudes we
capture in our measure were collected more than 10 years before the period of analysis,
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the labour market conditions, but acknowledging that this is not sufficient, we proceed
as follows. To check whether some other factor determines both the level of attitudes
and the differences in income and quality of life in the region, we include in one of the
robustness tests another group in our analysis, immigrants from developed countries,
that we expect not to be significantly affected by attitudes. The idea is that if our esti-
mation of the effect of attitudes on income and amenities is the result of some other
factor that produces lower income, we should estimate the same effect on this placebo
group.
There are no considerable differences between these two groups of immigrants with
respect to observable individual characteristics. They have on average a similar age
(39.5 for immigrants from developed countries versus 38 for the refugees), gender com-
position (58 versus 55 % are women) and civil status (64 versus 68 % are married).
Most importantly, their educational level is not that different. In a measure that scales
from 0 (no education at all) to 6 (Ph.D. level), where a value of 3 corresponds to high-
school education, the variable “well educated” in our study refers to values 4 to 6. The
average level of education of immigrants from developed countries is 3.7 (with a stand-
ard deviation of 1.4), while it is 3.3 (with a standard deviation of 1.3) for the refugees in
our sample.3.4 Results
3.4.1 How do the variables of interest affect income?
Table 3 shows a simple analysis of the moving decision and how the refugees’ income
is affected by the variables of interest, that is, by negative attitudes towards immigration
in the municipality and the size of the refugees’ networks. To account for the fact that
many refugees have moved from the municipality where they were initially placed by
the authorities, we apply a Heckman correction. This means that we only analyse the
effect of the variables of interest on the income of stayers and we correct for the bias
that arises by considering only stayers.
The first column in Table 3 shows that the refugees’ income is higher in municipal-
ities with lower negative attitudes and smaller networks.14 The average level of negative
attitudes towards immigration in the whole sample is 0.336, with a standard deviation
of 0.10. The average level of the share of refugees is 0.075, with a standard deviation of
0.05. A one standard deviation increase in negative attitudes towards immigration is as-
sociated with a 1.6 % lower income for the refugees. A one standard deviation increase
in the size of the network is associated with a 2.5 % lower income for the refugees.
Low-educated refugees receive 18 % lower incomes than well-educated refugees, and
female refugees receive 28 % lower incomes than males.15 The refugees’ incomes also
increase with age. Refugees’ income is higher in municipalities with lower open un-
employment and higher municipal taxes.
The effect of the variables of interest seems to be stronger on the decision to stay
than on incomes. A one standard deviation decrease in negative attitudes towards im-
migration is associated with a 6.6 % higher probability that refugees stay where they
had been placed. The probability that a refugee stays where he or she has been placed
depends strongly on the size of the network, defined as the share of refugees in the
Table 3 Heckman estimation of the probability of staying where placed and the effect on the
income of stayers correcting for the selection bias
Income of stayer Prob (stay)
Negative attitudes towards immigration −0.16 *** −0.66 ***
(0.06) (0.04)
Share of refugees −0.49 ** 8.25 ***
(0.24) (0.14)
Well educated 0.18 *** −0.11 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.25 *** 0.01 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Age 2 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Woman −0.28 *** 0.05 ***
(0.01) (0.01)
Married/cohabitant 0.02 0.17 ***
(0.02) (0.01)
Open unemployment −0.07 *** 0.01 **
(0.01) (0.00)
Municipal tax rate 0.02 ** −0.10 ***
(0.01) (0.01)




Average minimum temperature in winter 0.13 ***
(0.00)
Fixed and year effects Yes Yes
Observations 155,223
Regional fixed effects at the county level. Standard errors clustered at the labour market area level displayed under
the coefficients
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; and ***significant at the 1 % level
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with a 41 % higher probability that refugees stay where they had been placed.
Well-educated refugees are 11 % less likely to stay than low educated, women are 5 %
more likely to stay than men and married refugees are 17 % more likely to stay than
those that are unmarried. This probably reflects higher costs of moving for low edu-
cated, women and families with children. Refugees prefer to stay in municipalities with
warmer winters (higher average minimum temperature in winter) and at lower latitudes
(more even light distribution over the year). Refugees prefer to stay in municipalities
with a large population, low municipal tax rate and higher open unemployment.
In conclusion, we find that more severe negative attitudes towards immigration are
associated with a lower probability that a refugee stays where he or she has been placed
as well as lower income, while a larger network is associated with a higher probability
that a refugee stays where he or she has been placed but lower income. We would a
priori expect larger networks to be associated with higher income, as refugees provide
Waisman and Larsen IZA Journal of Migration  (2016) 5:8 Page 14 of 32each other information and references that can help in the labour market, but this
argument relies on networks that are established in the labour market already.
Until now, we have ignored the information we have on the movers’ incomes. We
can actually make use of all the information we have by studying the migration decision
directly. In this way, we exploit the fact that the refugees were placed in their first loca-
tion by the government and then many of them chose to move providing us with add-
itional information about their preferences by their new location choice.
In the next section, we proceed then to consider simultaneously the effect of the vari-
ables of interest on incomes and amenities (or quality of life), making use of the infor-
mation on income for all refugees and not just the stayers and extracting additional
information from the migration decision of the refugees.
3.4.2 Simultaneous estimation of the effect on income and amenities
In Table 4 and the following tables, the results are presented in three columns that cor-
respond to the coefficients of the income functions of stayers (at the placement munici-
pality), the income functions of movers (at the target municipality) and the amenity
function (a combination of difference in quality of life and costs of moving). In the last
column, we estimate how the variables of interest and the various controls affect the
migration decision of the refugees.
Table 4 contains the results for the whole group of refugees in our sample, assuming
that the residuals at the placement and target municipalities are independent of each
other. We show the coefficients of all explanatory variables (variables of interest, con-
trols and covariates) except the fixed and year effects. From now on, tables will focus
on the variables of interest.
As we allow the coefficients to differ for the income at the placement municipality
(incomes received by stayers) and at the target municipality (received by movers), we
can examine which of these groups is most affected by the variables of interest.
In Table 4, we find that negative attitudes affect the income of stayers and movers in
a very similar way. A one standard deviation increase in negative attitudes is associated
with a 4 % lower income of both stayers and movers. Networks affect stayers’ income
in a positive way, while they do not seem to have much effect on movers’ income. A
one standard deviation increase in the size of networks is associated with a 16 % higher
income for stayers.
The coefficients of covariates and controls have the expected signs. Education seems
to pay more for movers than for stayers. Women that moved are punished more for
their gender than those who stayed. Marriage affects only the income of stayers. The
income of both stayers and movers are lower in municipalities with higher unemploy-
ment, and only the income of stayers is higher if the population is larger.
More severe negative attitudes towards immigration in the municipality of placement
compared to the target municipality are associated with lower quality of life, while a larger
network is associated with higher quality of life. The regression performed allows us to
measure how the variables of interest relate to the refugees’ quality of life in monetary
terms, that is, in terms of income. A one standard deviation difference in negative attitudes
towards immigration between the municipality of placement and the target municipality is
associated with a lower quality of life equivalent to 18 % of the income. A one standard de-
viation difference in networks is associated with a higher quality of life equivalent to as
Table 4 Structural estimation—uncorrelated errors
Income stayers Income movers Quality of life/cost of moving
(1) (2) (3)
Neg. attitudes −0.37 ** −0.38 ** −1.75 ***
(0.16) (0.18) (1.11)
% refugees 3.11 *** 0.18 28.68 ***
(0.81) (0.20) (5.68)
Highly educated 0.08 *** 0.37 *** −0.41 ***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.09)
Age 0.24 *** 0.26 *** −0.08 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 2 −0.003 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Woman −0.23 *** −0.29 *** 0.16 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Married 0.10 ** 0.00 0.24 ***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.08)
% open unemp. −0.08 *** −0.10 *** 0.06
(0.02) (0.01) (0.11)
Mun. tax rate −0.03 0.00 −0.17 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)




Av. min. winter temp. 0.22 **
(0.10)
Fixed and year effects obs. Yes Yes Yes
122,571
Regional fixed effects at the county area level. Standard errors clustered at the labour market area level displayed under
the coefficients. In column (3), each explanatory variable is defined as the differences in values between the variable at
placement and the variable at the target municipality
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; and ***significant at the 1 % level
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of refugees to live close to other refugees, preferably coming from the same region of origin.
Well-educated and younger individuals have lower cost of moving, while women and
married refugees have higher moving costs. Warmer weather, larger population and
lower municipal taxes are also associated with higher quality of life.
Until now, we have assumed that the residuals of the income and amenity equations are
independent of each other at the placement and target municipalities. This assumption is
not realistic. Some refugees in our sample are traumatized by war (something we cannot
observe in the data) and will probably have lower income than what we would expect (given
all explanatory variables) in the income regressions in both municipalities. We therefore
now explore the consequences a correlation of residuals would have on our results.
3.4.3 Simultaneous estimation with correlated residuals
A refugee with low education but very high ability and vast working experience before com-
ing to Sweden is likely to have a higher income at placement than what we would expect in
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our regression. If he or she moves to another municipality, his or her income is likely to be
high there as well. This means that the correlation in residuals is likely to be positive.
If we could observe the income of many refugees before and after moving, then it
would be possible to estimate this correlation. But most movers actually did so soon
after the placement, long before we observe them in our sample. Because of this, we
simply introduce a range of correlations of residuals in our main regression (from 0 to
0.5) and study how the coefficients change with this introduction. In Table 5, we
present (for the sake of space) just the coefficients corresponding to the variables of
interest, but all regressions include all the covariates and controls shown in Table 4.
With uncorrelated residuals, negative attitudes seemed to affect equally the income
of movers and stayers. As we assume a larger correlation of residuals, the coefficient of
stayers becomes more negative, while the coefficient of movers becomes insignificantly
different from zero. Once we recognize that some characteristics of the refugees, which
we do not observe, affect their income in all municipalities, we find that negative attitudes
are a problem for the refugees that stayed where they had been placed, while movers seem
to escape discrimination somehow.16 A one standard deviation increase in negative atti-
tudes is associated with a 5.1 % lower income of stayers and a lower quality of life of all
refugees (stayers and movers) by an equivalent of 14.3 % of their income.
Larger networks seem to be associated with higher income for stayers but lower in-
come for movers and with much larger quality of life for all refugees. The fact that
quality of life is so strongly affected by the size of networks explains why refugees tend
to move to municipalities with larger networks even if this could affect their income
negatively. A one standard deviation larger network is associated with a 29 % higherTable 5 Structural estimation—all refugees—different levels of error correlation
Income stayers Income movers Quality of life/cost of moving
(1) (2) (3)
Uncorrelated errors
Neg. attitudes −0.37 ** −0.38 ** −1.75 ***
(0.16) (0.18) (1.11)
% refugees 3.11 *** 0.18 28.68 ***
(0.81) (0.20) (5.68)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.46 *** −0.34 −1.63 *
(0.15) (0.23) (0.96)
% refugees 4.97 *** −0.28 * 27.13 ***
(0.33) (0.15) (4.93)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.51 *** −0.31 −1.43 *
(0.20) (0.26) (0.80)
% refugees 5.73 *** −0.42 ** 23.91 ***
(0.52) (0.17) (4.11)
The three structural regressions (one for each assumed correlation of residuals) have the same controls and covariates as
the regression in Table 4. Standard errors clustered at the labour market area level displayed under the coefficients. In
column (3), each explanatory variable is defined as the differences in values between the variable at placement and the
variable at the target municipality
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; and ***significant at the 1 % level
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refugees (stayers and movers) by an equivalent of 1.2 times their income.
The explanation behind the asymmetric impact on stayers and movers may be that the
stayers were luckier in the sense that they already had a well-established network when they
arrived into a municipality. It could be the case that these workers were more attractive for
the municipality and therefore were placed according to their choice and close to their ac-
quaintances and relatives already in the country. On the other hand, those who moved may
then have been less attractive to the municipality and less capable of benefitting from a net-
work even after moving. On top of that, the less capable refugees may suffer from competi-
tion from other better-connected refugees in the municipality they chose to move to.
Movers still move to municipalities with a much larger share of refugees, which indicates
that the increase in quality of life is much larger than the decrease in income.
We have until now treated all the refugees as a single group. We now study how het-
erogeneity in terms of education and gender affects our results.
3.4.4 Heterogeneity in terms of education
Table 6 presents the results taking into account the heterogeneity of refugees in terms of
education. If we do not take into account any residual correlation, we find that negative
attitudes are associated with lower income of low-educated movers and well-educated
stayers. The quality of life of well-educated refugees is affected, while the coefficient for
low educated is not significantly different from zero (but still has a negative coefficient).
When we introduce residual correlation to recognize that some characteristics of the
refugees that we do not observe affect their income in all municipalities, we return to
the general result that movers’ income is not affected by negative attitudes. When we
assume a correlation of 0.5, a one standard deviation increase in negative attitudes is
associated with a 4.5 % lower income of stayers with low education and a 6.6 % lower
income of well-educated stayers. A one standard deviation increase in negative attitudes
is associated with a 19.7 % lower quality of life of well-educated refugees, while the co-
efficient is negative but not significantly different from zero for low-educated refugees.
Larger networks are associated with higher income of stayers and larger quality of life
for all refugees, with slightly larger coefficients for the well-educated refugees. At the same
time, larger networks are associated with lower income of low-educated movers, while
well-educated movers’ income is not negatively affected by the size of networks. A one
standard deviation larger network is associated with a 26.7 % larger income for low-
educated stayers, a 34.5 % larger income for well-educated stayers, a 3.3 % lower income
for low-educated movers, a higher quality of life equivalent to 1.19 times their income for
low-educated refugees and 1.21 times their income for well-educated refugees.
3.4.5 Heterogeneity in terms of gender
Table 7 shows the effect of the variables of interest on female and male refugees. The
effect of negative attitudes is somehow larger for female refugees, while the effect of
networks is somehow larger for male refugees (independently of the residual correl-
ation assumed), but the differences in the coefficients are very small. Attitudes and net-
work effects do not seem to differ much by gender.
3.4.6 Immigrants from developed countries
We now focus on immigrants from developed countries, a group of immigrants who are
not refugees and have never been placed. As we explained before, we study them as a
Table 6 Structural estimation—low-educated refugees and well-educated refugees




Neg. attitudes −0.25 −0.35 ** −1.41
(0.16) (0.15) (1.28)
% refugees 2.76 *** −0.03 28.29 ***
(0.76) (0.23) (5.71)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.37 ** −0.29 −1.36
(0.15) (0.20) (1.11)
% refugees 4.54 *** −0.51 *** 26.86 ***
(0.34) (0.17) (4.92)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.45 ** −0.26 −1.25
(0.20) (0.23) (0.92)




Neg. attitudes −0.73 *** −0.49 −2.80 ***
(0.22) (0.34) (0.91)
% refugees 4.10 *** 0.71 * 29.92 ***
(0.98) (0.39) (6.07)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.71 *** −0.48 −2.42 ***
(0.18) (0.37) (0.80)
% refugees 6.26 *** 0.30 27.98 ***
(0.43) (0.36) (5.34)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.66 *** −0.47 −1.97 ***
(0.22) (0.38) (0.67)
% refugees 6.90 *** 0.22 24.29 ***
(0.69) (0.31) (4.57)
Same controls and covariates as in the regression in Table 4
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; and ***significant at the 1 % level
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termines both an increase in the level of negative attitudes and a reduction in the income
and quality of life in the region, then we should estimate the same effect on this group.
Table 8 presents summary statistics and shows that immigrants from developed coun-
tries live in a municipality with average negative attitudes of 0.345 (with a standard devi-
ation of 0.1) and average share of refugees of 0.07 (with a standard deviation of 0.06).
Table 9 shows the coefficients of the variables of interest on income and quality of life
for this new group. Independently of the assumption about residual correlation, the co-
efficients for negative attitudes are never significantly different from zero. When
Table 7 Structural estimation—female refugees and male refugees




Neg. attitudes −0.41 * −0.41 ** −1.82
(0.21) (0.19) (1.12)
% refugees 2.57 *** 0.19 25.32 ***
(0.62) (0.26) (5.54)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.48 *** −0.37 −1.66 *
(0.16) (0.24) (0.98)
% refugees 4.32 *** −0.28 23.93 ***
(0.39) (0.19) (4.77)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.51 *** −0.35 −1.42 *
(0.19) (0.28) (0.81)




Neg. attitudes −0.30 ** −0.36 * −1.65
(0.15) (0.19) (1.14)
% refugees 3.71 *** 0.18 32.42 ***
(1.07) (0.21) (5.99)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.41 ** −0.31 −1.58
(0.18) (0.23) (0.99)
% refugees 5.67 *** −0.29 30.69 ***
(0.48) (0.21) (5.25)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.48 ** −0.27 −1.43 *
(0.23) (0.25) (0.82)
% refugees 6.39 *** −0.42 * 27.05 ***
(0.40) (0.24) (4.43)
Same controls and covariates as the regression in Table 4
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; and ***significant at the 1 % level
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of refugees is related to a 6.2 % increase of income for stayers from developed coun-
tries. At the same time, the same increase in the share of refugees is related to a de-
crease in the quality of life from immigrants from developed countries equivalent to
4.5 % of their income. In our preferred specification, when we assume a residual correl-
ation of 0.5, the income of immigrants from developed countries is not related to the
share of refugees at all, while their quality of life is. A one standard deviation increase
in the share of refugees is related to a 2.9 % decrease of their quality of life, a smaller
figure than what we found with uncorrelated errors.
Table 8 Summary statistics for immigrants from developed countries
Observations Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Individual characteristics
Ln income 19,407 11.7 1.4 0.7 16.2
Share well educated 50,152 0.28 0.4 0 1
Age 50,152 38.6 11.2 15 65
Share women 50,152 0.52 0.5 0 1
Share married 50,152 0.61 0.5 0 1
Municipal characteristics where the stayers live
Neg. attitudes towards immigration 31,216 0.346 0.1 0 0.75
Share refugees 31,216 0.073 0.06 0.002 0.264
Open unemployment 31,216 4.45 1.91 0.79 13.79
Municipal tax rate 31,211 31.1 1.34 26.5 34.35
Population 29,508 211.8 270.0 3.1 847.1
Latitude 31,216 58.9 2.02 55.37 67.85
Avge. min. temperature in winter 31,216 −5.19 2.89 −20.0 −1.33
Municipal characteristics where the movers live
Neg. attitudes towards immigration 18,931 0.344 0.1 0 0.75
Share refugees 18,931 0.066 0.05 0.002 0.264
Open unemployment 18,922 4.03 1.79 0.79 13.79
Municipal tax rate 18,908 31.07 1.35 26.5 34.41
Population (thousands) 17,804 155.8 234.8 3.2 847.1
Latitude 18,931 59.0 2.04 55.37 67.85
Avge. min. temperature in winter 18,931 −5.31 2.84 −20.0 −1.33
Municipal characteristics where the movers lived first
Neg. attitudes towards immigration 18,932 0.337 0.1 0 0.75
Share refugees 18,932 0.067 0.05 0.002 0.264
Open unemployment 18,932 4.31 1.85 0.82 13.79
Municipal tax rate 17,322 31.25 1.37 26.5 34.41
Population 17,804 197.5 271.9 2.7 847.1
Latitude 18,932 59.28 2.16 55.37 67.85
Avge. min. temperature in winter 18,932 −5.75 3.28 −20 −1.33
The sample corresponds to the years 1996–2009
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veloped countries. Networks affect their quality of life but in an opposite way than the
effect for refugees. We find very different results for immigrants from developed coun-
tries and refugees, providing evidence against the idea that some other factor, which we
have not considered in our regressions, determines both an increase in our variables of
interest and a reduction in the income and quality of life in the region.3.5 Robustness test
3.5.1 Interaction between negative attitudes and networks
We have assumed that attitudes are constant over time and provided evidence (in Figure
2 in the Appendix) that attitudes in the country as a whole have become less negative at
times when the share of refugees have increased strongly. We think of attitudes as
Table 9 Immigrants from developed countries
Income stayers Income movers Quality of life/cost of moving
(1) (2) (3)
Independent errors
Neg. attitudes −0.30 −0.12 0.99
(0.28) (0.17) (1.30)
% refugees 0.89 * 0.42 −6.38 *****
(0.45) (0.30) (2.76)
Correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.24 −0.23 0.87
(0.26) (0.18) (1.22)
% refugees 1.06 0.50 −5.27 **
(0.66) (0.33) (2.38)
Correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.20 −0.32 0.76
(0.24) (0.19) (1.08)
% refugees 1.18 0.66 −4.12 **
(0.88) (0.41) (1.96)
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values in a stronger or weaker way depending on the situation (such as the share of refu-
gees), which does change over time.
To explore this assumption, we introduce an interaction term to analyse whether the
same negative attitudes towards immigrants affect the refugees differently depending
on the share of refugees in the municipality.
Table 10 shows the coefficients of the two variables of interest and the coefficient of
their interaction. In this regression, the total effect of every variable of interest is a sum
of a direct effect plus an indirect effect through the interaction term, meaning that we
estimate the total effect in a municipality with average variables of interest. All regres-
sions include the same covariates and controls as the regression in Table 4. We present
the coefficients for the three assumed residual correlations as before, but will discuss
mainly the coefficients of our preferred specification (with a residual correlation of 0.5),
where we recognize that some unobservable characteristics of the refugees affect their
income in all municipalities.
The interaction term has a negative coefficient in the stayers’ income equation, im-
plying that the negative effect we saw in Table 6 is stronger the larger the size of refu-
gees. Similarly, the direct effect of networks is larger than what we found in Table 6,
but the total effect is restricted by the negative interaction term. Negative attitudes did
not seem to affect the movers’ income in Table 6, but they do affect them via a negative
direct effect that is counteracted by a positive interaction effect. So larger networks are
associated with lower movers’ income in municipalities where negative attitudes
towards immigrants are small but associated with higher movers’ income in municipal-
ities where attitudes are very strong.
Introducing an interaction term means that we can only compute the total effect of
an increase in negative attitudes or networks in an average municipality. However, we
need to take into account that the average municipalities for stayers and movers are
Table 10 Robustness test I: structural estimation including interaction terms—all refugees
Income stayers Income movers Quality of life/cost of moving
(1) (2) (3)
Uncorrelated errors
Neg. attitudes −0.53 −0.70 *** −5.45 ***
(0.35) (0.19) (2.01)
% refugees 3.18 *** −1.53 30.06 ***
(1.16) (1.26) (5.49)
Neg. att. * % refugees −0.19 4.45 −114.32 ***
(2.76) (3.09) (41.31)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.21 −0.66 *** −5.20 ***
(0.26) (0.26) (1.70)
% refugees 3.55 ** −2.54 27.74 ***
(1.79) (1.98) (4.67)
Neg. att. * % refugees −4.09 5.25 −114.77 ***
(3.72) (4.77) (36.17)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.32 −0.86 *** −4.65 ***
(0.26) (0.28) (1.43)
% refugees 8.00 *** −3.62 * 25.14 ***
(0.98) (1.92) (3.88)
Neg. att. * % refugees −5.70 *** 8.39 * −102.49 ***
(1.69) (4.45) (30.15)
The three structural regressions (one for each assumed correlation of residuals) have the same controls and covariates as
the regression in Table 4. Standard errors clustered at the labour market area level displayed under the coefficients. In
column (3), each explanatory variable is defined as the differences in values between the variable at placement and the
variable at the target municipality
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; and ***significant at the 1 % level
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first the average difference in negative attitudes and networks.17
A one standard deviation increase in negative attitudes decreases the income of
stayers by 4.3 % in a municipality with average networks via the interaction effect,18
and the movers’ income decreases by 2.5 % through both the direct and indirect
effects.19 At the same time, a one standard deviation increase in the size of networks
increases the stayers’ income by 30 % and decreases the movers’ income by 4 % (via
both the direct and indirect effects). 20
The negative interaction term in the quality of life regression indicates that negative
attitudes are more problematic for refugees in municipalities where networks are large.
A one standard deviation increase in negative attitudes is related to lower quality of life
by an equivalent to 49 % of the refugees’ income, given the average difference in the
size of networks for stayers and movers.21 An increase in the size of the network by
one standard deviation increases quality of life by an equivalent of 1.23 times the refu-
gees’ income, given the average difference in negative attitudes.22
Tables 11 and 12 show the same regressions taking into account the heterogen-
eity by education and gender. In Table 13, we have collected the estimation of
the total effects of both negative attitudes towards immigration and networks on
Table 11 Different educational levels




Neg. attitudes −0.38 −0.57 *** −5.37 **
(0.39) (0.22) (2.52)
% refugees 3.11 ** −1.28 29.77 ***
(1.36) (1.33) (5.62)
Neg. att. * % refugees −0.88 3.22 −121.42 **
(3.50) (3.36) (50.00)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.06 −0.52 * −5.20 **
(0.29) (0.29) (2.13)
% refugees 3.69 * −2.25 27.63 ***
(2.16) (2.05) (4.76)
Neg. att. * % refugees −5.16 3.80 −121.85 ***
(4.48) (5.09) (43.58)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.22 −0.70 ** −4.65 ***
(0.26) (0.29) (1.75)
% refugees 7.96 *** −3.31 * 25.06 ***
(1.22) (2.03) (3.89)




Neg. attitudes −1.16 *** −1.07 ** −5.80 ***
(0.42) (0.46) (1.49)
% refugees 2.59 −2.36 31.12 ***
(1.68) (1.61) (5.67)
Neg. att. * % refugees 3.88 8.06 ** −94.81 **
(3.48) (3.65) (38.39)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.73 * −1.13 *** −5.33 ***
(0.38) (0.40) (1.33)
% refugees 2.80 * −3.54 * 28.20 ***
(1.62) (1.94) (4.89)
Neg. att. * % refugees 0.07 9.60 ** −96.23 ***
(3.55) (4.32) (34.34)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.67 * −1.33 *** −4.68 ***
(0.39) (0.44) (1.12)
% refugees 7.84 *** −4.46 ** 25.46 ***
(0.96) (1.76) (4.26)
Neg. att. * % refugees −2.38 12.29 *** −88.99 ***
(2.89) (4.05) (28.20)
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; and ***significant at the 1 % level
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Table 12 Different genders




Neg. attitudes −0.83 ** −0.64 *** −6.29 ***
(0.41) (0.23) (1.86)
% refugees 1.48 −1.05 27.07 ***
(1.60) (1.38) (5.32)
Neg. att. * % refugees 2.80 3.24 −138.37 ***
(3.24) (3.54) (34.74)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.45 −0.67 *** −5.87 ***
(0.33) (0.26) (1.54)
% refugees 2.12 −2.39 24.83 ***
(1.31) (2.03) (4.53)
Neg. att. * % refugees −1.49 4.90 −134.64 ***
(2.68) (5.05) (29.93)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.50 −0.93 *** −5.19 ***
(0.36) (0.28) (1.25)
% refugees 6.62 *** −3.75 * 22.56 ***
(0.74) (2.02) (3.65)




Neg. attitudes −0.21 −0.78 *** −4.59 **
(0.45) (0.24) (2.20)
% refugees 5.03 *** −2.19 33.48 ***
(1.79) (1.45) (5.85)
Neg. att. * % refugees −3.34 6.16 * −91.40 *
(5.29) (3.43) (50.63)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.05 −0.69 ** −4.54 **
(0.39) (0.30) (1.90)
% refugees 5.15 −2.88 31.07 ***
(3.24) (2.11) (4.96)
Neg. att. * % refugees −6.92 6.10 −95.81 **
(7.20) (4.95) (44.99)
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Table 12 Different genders (Continued)
Correlated errors—correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.13 −0.83 *** −4.09 **
(0.33) (0.30) (1.64)
% refugees 9.44 *** −3.68 * 28.05 ***
(2.10) (1.95) (4.23)
Neg. att. * % refugees −7.65 * 8.54 ** −85.04 **
(4.35) (4.35) (38.50)
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; and ***significant at the 1 % level
Waisman and Larsen IZA Journal of Migration  (2016) 5:8 Page 25 of 32the income of stayers and movers and on the quality of life of all refugees in a
municipality with average attitudes and networks (for stayers and for movers) and
given average differences in the variables of interest.
The total effects estimated are only valid in theoretical municipalities, but the exer-
cise allows us to compare the effects across education levels and gender when inter-
action is explicitly taken into account as the relationship will be valid in any
municipality. The total effect is a combination of the direct effect and the indirect effect
through the interaction term. More negative attitudes are in general associated with
lower income and with lower quality of life. We focus here on the total effect when
residual correlation is assumed to be 0.5.
Negative attitudes affect well-educated stayers’ income more than low-educated
stayers’ income and male more than female stayers’ income. Inversely, negative at-
titudes affect low-educated movers’ income more than well-educated movers’ in-
come and female more than male movers’ income. Negative attitudes also seem toTable 13 Summary of results including interaction terms













All workers 0.00 −0.07 −0.57 −0.04 −0.02 −0.49
Low educated 0.00 −0.06 −0.56 −0.05 −0.07 −0.49
Well educated −0.12 −0.05 −0.60 −0.07 −0.04 −0.49
Women −0.08 −0.06 −0.66 −0.03 −0.03 −0.54
Men 0.00 −0.03 −0.48 −0.06 −0.02 −0.43
Developed countries 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00













All workers 0.16 0.00 1.47 0.30 −0.04 1.23
Low educated 0.16 0.00 1.45 0.29 −0.17 1.22
Well educated 0.00 0.13 1.53 0.39 −0.02 1.25
Women 0.00 −0.04 1.31 0.27 −0.04 1.09
Men 0.34 0.10 1.65 0.34 −0.04 1.38
Developed countries 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.32
Total effect (combined direct and indirect effects) in a municipality with average attitudes and networks, taking into
account that the average municipality for stayers is different than the average municipality for movers
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no difference by education level.
Larger networks are associated with higher income of stayers and lower income
of movers. The fact that movers still, on average, choose to move to municipalities
with larger share of refugees determines the larger positive effect of networks on
the quality of life of all refugees. The effects are similar to those of negative atti-
tudes in terms of heterogeneity. Networks affect well-educated more than low-
educated stayers’ income and male more than female stayers’ income. Inversely,
networks affect low-educated more than well-educated movers’ income and female
more than male movers’ income. Networks seem to affect the quality of life of
low-educated more than well-educated refugees and the quality of life of female
more than male refugees.
Regressions including the interaction terms lead to the conclusion that the effect of
negative attitudes on the stayers’ income and on the quality of life is stronger (more
negative) in municipalities with a larger share of refugees. At the same time, the effect
on the movers’ income is weaker in such municipalities. In the case of networks, the
interaction term always has the opposite sign than the direct effect.
Attitudes have a negative total effect on stayers and movers’ income and on the qual-
ity of life of all refugees independently of the size of networks. Networks have a positive
effect on the stayers’ income and a negative effect on the movers’ income, while the
total effect on the quality of life is positive and large, as the refugees choose to move to
municipalities with larger networks despite the (small) negative effect on their income.
3.5.2 Removing some countries of origin
We have chosen the countries in our sample such that the individuals we study
are likely to be refugees. We can increase this likelihood somewhat by removing
from the sample individuals originating from Poland. Out of 1422 residence per-
mits obtained by Polish immigrants, only 47 correspond to refugees. No other
country in our sample has such a low proportion of refugees as a share of all resi-
dence permits. However, recall that almost all the rest of the immigrants getting a
residence permit are due to family reunion and therefore indirectly will be affected
by the placement as well.
We present in Tables 14 and 15 the results of our regressions, first excluding
and then including an interaction term and assuming in both cases three differ-
ent possible error correlations (0, 0.25 and 0.50). The exclusion of immigrants
from Poland hardly changes the regression results. In our preferred specification
with an error correlation of 0.5, negative attitudes are associated with lower
stayers’ income and lower quality of life of all refugees, while a larger network is
related to larger stayers’ income, lower movers’ income and an increase in the
quality of life of all refugees which is large enough to compensate movers for
the income reduction when they choose a municipality with a large share of
refugees.
4 Conclusions
The main result in our study is that negative attitudes in a municipality are problematic
for all refugees. These findings may be evidence of discrimination of refugees. Most
Table 14 Robustness test II: Polish immigrants excluded from the sample
Income stayers Income movers Quality of life/cost of moving
(1) (2) (3)
Independent errors
Neg. attitudes −0.34 * −0.39 ** −1.78
(0.18) (0.19) (1.22)
% refugees 3.19 *** 0.13 30.13 ***
(0.87) (0.22) (5.93)
Correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.45 *** −0.34 −1.66
(0.16) (0.24) (1.06)
% refugees 5.12 *** −0.34 ** 28.53 ***
(0.30) (0.16) (5.14)
Correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.51 *** −0.31 −1.46 *
(0.19) (0.27) (0.88)
% refugees 5.93 *** −0.49 *** 25.20 ***
(0.50) (0.18) (4.28)
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; and ***significant at the 1 % level
Table 15 Robustness test II: Polish immigrants excluded from the sample—including interaction
term
Income stayers Income movers Quality of life/cost of moving
(1) (2) (3)
Independent errors
Neg. attitudes −0.47 −0.71 *** −5.75 **
(0.35) (0.22) (2.30)
% refugees 3.54 *** −1.66 31.61 ***
(1.10) (1.33) (3.13)
Neg. att. * % refugees −0.89 4.63 −121.88 ***
(2.36) (3.34) (46.75)
Correlation: 0.25
Neg. attitudes −0.36 −0.80 *** −5.42 ***
(0.26) (0.27) (1.99)
% refugees 6.86 *** −2.92 29.96 ***
(0.64) (1.80) (4.99)
Neg. att. * % refugees −4.35 *** 6.71 −117.50 ***
(1.70) (4.27) (41.29)
Correlation: 0.50
Neg. attitudes −0.29 −0.84 *** −4.89 ***
(0.26) (0.32) (1.63)
% refugees 8.54 *** −3.52 * 26.50 ***
(0.86) (2.10) (4.09)
Neg. att. * % refugees −6.52 *** 7.96 −108.36 ***
(1.78) (4.89) (34.23)
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; and ***significant at the 1 % level
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Waisman and Larsen IZA Journal of Migration  (2016) 5:8 Page 28 of 32affected is the quality of life of refugees, indicating that discrimination is a more
serious problem in areas other than the labour market. We also find some evi-
dence of discrimination in the labour market. When we recognize that some unob-
servable characteristics of the refugees affect their income in all municipalities, we
find that only the stayers’ income is negatively related to negative attitudes towards
immigration. The effect is not large but may indicate that stayers are held back by
high costs of moving.
The refugees’ choice of where to live is also strongly affected by the availability
of networks. Larger networks are associated with a much larger quality of life,
higher income for stayers and lower income for movers. We would expect the
movers to be able to relocate to a municipality where networks can be most help-
ful. However, an explanation for this can be that stayers have been luckier in their
placement in the sense that they already had a well-established network when they
arrived into a municipality. These workers may have been more attractive for the
municipality and therefore may have been placed according to their choice—close
to their acquaintances and relatives already in the country. On the other hand,
those who moved may have been less attractive to the municipality and less cap-
able of benefitting from a network even after moving. Additionally, the less capable
refugees may suffer from competition from other better-connected refugees in the
municipality they chose to move to. Movers still move to municipalities with a
much larger share of refugees, which indicates that the increase in amenities is
much larger than the decrease in income.
The interaction between negative attitudes towards immigration and the size of
networks are of importance as well. The negative relationship between negative at-
titudes and quality of life becomes larger when networks are larger. The same is
true about the negative relationship between negative attitudes and stayers’ income,
while the negative relationship between negative attitudes and movers’ income be-
comes smaller when networks are larger.
When we consider heterogeneity in terms of education, we observe that more
negative attitudes reduce the income of all stayers, but it reduces the amenities of
well-educated refugees only. Larger networks are associated with higher income of
stayers and larger quality of life for all refugees, with slightly larger coefficients for
the well-educated refugees. At the same time, larger networks are associated with
lower income of low-educated movers, while well-educated movers’ income is not
negatively affected by the size of networks.
When we consider heterogeneity in terms of gender, we observe that the effect
of negative attitudes is somehow larger for female refugees, while the effect of
networks is somehow larger for male refugees, but the differences in the coeffi-
cients are very small. Attitudes and network effects do not seem to differ much
by gender.
The income and the quality of life of immigrants from developed countries, our
placebo group, are not affected by negative attitudes towards immigrants. Further-
more, their quality of life is affected in an opposite way than the refugees’ quality
of life by the share of refugees. This is an indication that we are not capturing the
effect of omitted variables that affect both our variables of interest and the income
or amenities for all workers in a region.
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1Westin (2000).
2Source: Statistics Sweden.
3Seventy percent of the Swedish population take a positive view of the immigra-
tion of people from outside the EU in Sweden according to the Eurobarometer in
Autumn 2015, the highest share in the EU. Also, Sweden has the highest Migrant
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) in all EU Member States, Australia, Canada,
Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the
USA.
4Some examples are the Intolerance Report (BRÅ 2004) and Westin (2000).
5See Edin and Fredriksson (2000) for a presentation of this data set.
6We do not have this data separated for the period 1984–1989, only the total
figures for 1980–1989.
7The countries in our sample are former Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Cuba, Chile, Peru, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran,
China, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Syria, Turkey and Palestine.
8Except for Turkey, as many refugees came from this country during the period
studied.
9This is the variable depicted in Figure 2 in the Appendix for a later period.
10We have also considered alternative measures, such as just adding (1) and (2), with
no significant changes in the results.
11Most refugees that moved did so relatively soon after placement.
12We have performed the estimation using other potential targets, for example, an
average of the ten most preferred municipalities (as revealed by immigrants’ choices).
There were no substantial changes in the results.
13The regression is performed on the natural logarithm of income, which facilitates
the interpretation of the coefficients.
14The coefficients indicate the change in this probability for an infinitesimal change
in a continuous explanatory variable and the discrete change when dummies change
from 0 to 1.
15The positive effect of open unemployment on the probability that refugees stay
where placed is counterintuitive and seems to be explained by a correlation with the
geographical variables (latitude and temperature). If we run the same regression exclud-
ing the geographical variables, then open unemployment has a negative effect on the
probability to stay that is significantly different from zero.
16The coefficients continue to be negative, but they are not significantly different
from zero.
17Table 2 shows the average negative attitudes and networks for stayers and movers.
18ΔIncome stayer: −5.70 * 0.075 * Δa = −0.43 Δa
19ΔIncome mover: −0.86 * Δa + 8.39 * 0.073 * Δa = −0.25 Δa
20ΔIncome stayer: +8.00 * ΔN − 5.7 * 0.338 * ΔN = 6.07 ΔNΔIncome mover: −3.62 *
ΔN + 8.39 * 0.332 * ΔN = −0.83 ΔN
21ΔQuality of life: −4.65 * Δa − 102.49 * (0.075–0.073) * Δa = −4.85 Δa
22ΔQuality of life: 25.14 * ΔN − 102.49 * (0.338–0.332) * ΔN = 24.53 ΔN
23We can only calculate the correlation with approximate values of attitudes as we
see them on the graph.




























































Total Foreign born Born outside EU15
Fig. 2 Evolution of unemployment in SwedenAttitudes are much less negative today than when the analysed group of refugees ar-
rived. The share of refugees in the country has increased a lot since then. The fluctua-
tions in attitudes do not seem to be correlated with the fluctuations in total
unemployment, but there seems to be some correlation with the unemployment of
those who are foreign born.23 Source: Total unemployment rate: Statistics Sweden.




Fig. 3 Attitudes 1979–1985
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